Abstract. Theories of lawmaking have posited a variety of mechanisms at work in distributive politics-from party leaders using pork to reward loyalty and insulate electorally vulnerable members to committees exacting gains-from-exchange in an institution-wide logroll. Earmarks, or line-item projects added to appropriations bills, have received significant attention recently due to their prominent role in political debates and their status as the epitome of pork. However, it has been difficult to systematically assess individual-level influences on the distribution of earmarks because the projects were not tied to a specific member. However, due to recent changes in House rules that require members to attach their names to pet projects, we are now able to better understand how earmarks are distributed. In this paper, we assess institutional as well as constituency-level factors in explaining variation in the earmark receipts of individual House members at the level of the appropriations subcommittees that write the annual spending bills. We find that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, members rarely receive pork due to electoral vulnerability-rather, their status in the appropriations process, and to a somewhat lesser degree, constituency characteristics, shape the likelihood of success in procuring earmarks.
Despite a recent burgeoning of research on congressional earmarks, much remains to be learned about the process through which such projects are distributed. A longstanding literature in political science has linked pork, as a broadly defined legislative commodity, to the electoral interests of members of Congress. Yet the empirical basis for the argument that the legislature allocates pork in a manner favorable to vulnerable members is rather limited. Furthermore, existing scholarship has tended to treat the underlying mechanics in an amorphous way. Rarely is the process precisely specified, and theoretical treatments and empirical analyses often gloss over important aspects of the mechanics of congressional budgeting.
In this paper, we advance the understanding of the congressional pork barrel by wading deeper into the structural mechanisms of earmark distribution in the U.S. House of Representatives to demonstrate the nuanced factors shaping who wins and who loses. Unlike prior studies that have typically focused on a specific category of earmarks or lumped all earmarks into an aggregate sum, we incorporate the fact that nearly all earmarks are added in subcommittee (Crespin, Wanless, Finocchiaro 2009 ) to develop a theoretical argument of earmark distribution that also helps to reconcile the frequent conflicting findings that have plagued earlier works. We advance the argument that committee and subcommittee leaders not only benefit disproportionately in the earmark game, but that they are also the key players who shape how well their colleagues fare at the pork barrel.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the extant literature on pork and the factors associated with successful recipients. We then discuss our perspective on resource allocation, which begins to fill a long-standing gap in probing the micro-level institutional dynamics that characterize the distribution of earmarks. The following two sections describe our data and present the empirical results, and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and some avenues for future research.
The Distribution of Pork in Congress
For some time, scholars have pursued an understanding of the appropriations process from one of two broad perspectives about legislative organization-the distributive theory of lawmaking that centers explanations of outlays in an electoral context centered on the interest of individual members or the class of theories advancing the role of the majority party in structuring legislative outcomes.
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Recent work on pork barrel politics has incorporated insights from both the partisan and distributive models as well as broadened theorizing to include other considerations such as geography, the implications of bicameral variation in electoral cycles, and cross-chamber differences among various types of pork (Levitt and Snyder 1995 , Balla et al. 2002 , Lee 2003 , Evans 2004 , Crespin and Finocchiaro 2008 , Lazarus 2009 , Shepsle et al. 2009 ).
The growing literature on earmarks has, for various reasons, typically examined just a single type of earmark (e.g., Balla et al.'s 2002 analysis of academic earmarks and Lee's 2003 study of projects included in the 1998 transportation authorization bill) or pooled all earmarks irrespective of the appropriations bill in which the project was included (Lazarus 2009 , Shepsle et al. 2009 ).
The primary interest of these research endeavors has centered on uncovering broad partisan and/or electoral dynamics affecting the allocation of earmarks. And the resulting findings underscore the fact that the majority party often is advantaged -at least contingently -in the distribution of pork. One of the key contingencies centers on electoral circumstance, as scholars 1 The literature on distributive (Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1974; Weingast 1979; Weingast 1981, 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988; and Adler 2002) and partisan (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rohde 1991; McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 1998 , 2000a , 2000b , 2001 ) politics is vast. Since our purpose is to move a layer below the broad theories into the underlying mechanics of earmark distribution at the subcommittee level, we do not provide a detailed review here.
have found that members facing a more challenging electoral environment often receive a greater amount of pork than their more entrenched colleagues.
Yet the underlying mechanisms of the distributional process through which these outcomes are determined are rather amorphous. While the assumption that funds are funneled to specific members is clear, who is responsible for the division has been left largely unspecified.
For instance, Lazarus (2009) advances the argument that "majority party leaders are able to protect the projects going to their party's vulnerable members" (1050). Similarly, Crespin and Finocchiaro (2008) provide evidence that majority party senators receive a disproportionate share of earmarks relative to the minority, while Shepsle et al. (2009) demonstrate a cyclical effect in appropriations earmarks corresponding with the staggered nature of Senate elections. To date, however, a clear exposition of how party matters and who is responsible for the allocation decisions we observe has been lacking. Our aim is to begin to open this black box by highlighting some important aspects of the appropriations process in the House and, thereby, offering a more precise account of earmarking in Congress.
Supply and Demand at the Appropriations Subcommittee Level
The vast majority of earmarks are inserted into legislation well before a bill reaches the floor of the House or Senate; additionally, important differences exist across the appropriations subcommittees in the amount of pork distributed and the factors driving distribution Finocchiaro 2008, Shepsle et al. 2009 ). Thus, the picture of earmarks that emerges in the aggregate -for instance, 10,160 projects totaling $19.6 billion in 2009 -masks a tremendous amount of underlying variation among the 12 House and 12 Senate appropriations 4 subcommittees and the bills that they assemble.
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The production of the 12 appropriation bills is actually a complicated milieu of full and subcommittee staff and members, legislative vehicles that sometimes stand on their own while at other times end up being rolled into an omnibus measure, and accumulated requests from members for specific projects in their states and districts.
We begin with the observation that the universe of earmarks is not the best starting point for the study of this aspect of pork barrel politics. Rather, as Fenno (1966) observed, "the tasks of the Appropriations Committee are accomplished by its subcommittees" (134). Subcommittee autonomy is the norm, and subcommittees often have their own unique cultures and standard operating procedures. The 12 subcommittee chairs of each chamber, known as the "Cardinals" because of their significant position in the process, exert tremendous influence over the appropriations process, as do their ranking minority counterparts (Savage 1991) . The independence of the subcommittees also produces a level of influence for rank-and-file members of the subcommittee (Fenno 1966: 136) . This portrayal of subcommittee politics is also evident from an interview with one House staffer, who told us in his description of current earmark practices that each subcommittee "is its own entity and operates as such. They often require different information when making a request (i.e., some require a line item budget for the project
[while] others do not) and they all have some variation in procedures for submitting a request (some require paper and electronic submissions while others are all electronic)." . 3 The variation in practice between subcommittees is also evident in Shepsle and colleagues' (2009) observation that, while most panels insert most of their earmarks at the subcommittee stage, Labor/HHS traditionally inserts earmarks at the conference committee stage. that ranking members control minority projects and chairs control majority projects. In fact, as a staffer, I assume this as fact." 4 In light of how appropriations decisions are made in Congress, our study of earmarks in the House considers two key factors that have largely escaped attention in previous studies. First, our theoretical account models pork allocations at the subcommittee level and goes one step further to incorporate the direct effect of a member's status as a cardinal on that subcommittee.
While some studies have accounted for the fact that cardinals should do better, the linkage is rarely if ever made to the specific subcommittee of interest.
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Our argument is that, if subcommittees are the locus of decision making, then it is subcommittee chairs (and their minority party analogues -the ranking members) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, ordinary subcommittee members who should secure the most pork. One might think of this as the supply side of pork, since the subcommittee members -and in particular the cardinals and ranking members -are the ones who control the flow of pork more than any other. Relatedly, if members are rewarded (punished) in earmarks for ideological like-mindedness (divergence), then congruence with the relevant cardinal or ranking minority member should be the determinative factor rather than, for instance, broader party loyalty.
The second aspect of pork distribution that is critically important, yet rarely examined directly in the broader universe of earmark studies, is demand. Going back to the earlier studies of committee membership and distributive politics, scholars have recognized that members engage in self-selection of committee posts, often largely as a function of district interests. Thus, members from predominantly agriculturally-oriented districts seek assignment to committees dealing in agricultural issues, and so forth. The most recent treatment of district demand and committee assignment in the appropriations context, and committees more broadly, is that of Adler (2002) . While studies of earmarks have accounted for district demand to a limited extentfor instance Lee's (2003) study of transportation earmarks incorporates transportation-related measures -most studies do not model demand directly. Another approach has been to include general measures such as district liberalism (Lazarus 2009 ) that are unlikely to tap a district's demand for the specific type of government spending encapsulated in legislation produced by each appropriations subcommittee. As such, our examination of earmarks at the subcommittee level directly models district demand following Adler (2002) and his committee-by-committee specification of district characteristics, which we have extended through the 2000s series of redistricting.
In addition to these two dynamics which we add to the study of earmarks, we also account for other factors that previous scholarship has found to be important. In addition to subcommittee status as a rank-and-file member, ranking minority member or cardinal, it may be the case that the full committee chair and ranking minority member receive an earmark "bonus", as might ordinary members of the full committee who are not seated on the relevant subcommittee. Additionally, party leaders might also be expected to reap some rewards from their privileged institutional position. We also control for seniority and the competitiveness of the district, both of which are fairly standard measures in studies of pork (see, e.g., most recently
Lazarus 2009).

Data
The dependent variables in our study measure the earmarked dollars obtained by each legislator in the 110th House as reflected in the final conference report for 10 of the 12 appropriations bills. 6 We chose the 110th since -as the first House subject to new rules requiring committee disclosure of the legislator requesting each earmark -it allows us to more directly assess the degree to which individual members of Congress succeed in obtaining earmarks.
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In order to handle earmarks that were requested by more than one member of Congress, we divided the dollar amount of each earmark by the number of legislators that requested it and allotted that portion of the earmark to each legislator. Ultimately we generated ten variables at the member level: one for each of the appropriations subcommittees indicating the amount of earmark money received, and an additional variable indicating the total amount of pork received by each representative across subcommittees.
At this juncture, a few words are in order with respect to our decision to use earmark data as well as dollar value as opposed to project counts. An attractive feature of earmarks as a measure of "pork" is that they are relatively narrow in their definition and remain much more under the purview of members of Congress than do, for instance, programs identified by the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), which has been the vehicle for analysis in much of the prior research on distributive politics. Additionally, earmarks are not susceptible to analytical problems associated with endogeneity in the same way that other measures (like FAADS) might be, since efforts to obtain earmarks are limited to a short window of time and members are capped in what they can hope to obtain. 8 Thus, it is not likely the case that added effort on the part of vulnerable members is likely to produce significantly more earmarks -as such, concerns about a causal arrow that runs in both directions between earmarks and vulnerability are minimized. In addition, we choose to employ a dependent variable based on the dollar value of earmarks, despite the more common practice of estimating the number of projects, for two reasons. First, using a raw count limits our ability to distinguish among drastically variant awards because it treats a $100,000 earmark the same as a $1,000,000 earmark. Second, because the number of earmarks members may request is limited, there is a censoring that occurs in a count that is not present (or at least not as severe) for the dollar value of earmarks received.
To construct our independent variables measuring each representative's ideological proximity to important members of Congress, we used the Congressional Directory for the 110 th Congress to identify the chair and ranking member of each subcommittee of the appropriations committee, and to identify every representative that serves on the appropriations committee.
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Using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores, we then found the absolute ideological distance between each representative and the chair (for Democrats) or ranking member (for Republicans) of each appropriations subcommittee. Dichotomous variables in our data set indicate whether the member is a cardinal or ranking member of the full appropriations committee, a Cardinal or ranking member of a subcommittee, a member of the appropriations committee (or subcommittee where appropriate), a member of leadership (the top two positions in each party) and if the member is in the Democratic Party. We also constructed a measure of seniority that is the number of terms served in a career as reported by CQ's Politics in America (2007) . We also include a variable that identifies whether a member's prior election was competitive. We ultimately decided on using a dichotomous variable coded one if the member received less than 60 percent of the vote in the previous election. 10 We feel that a dichotomousas opposed to a continuous -variable is better since the traditional measure of competitiveness using previous vote share assumes a consistent linear effect from the most competitive to the least competitive district. These measures were then used to create a "demand" variable for each subcommittee. In order to create the subcommittee measures of demand, we again followed Adler and standardized each of the individual component measures (i.e. each component has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) and then summed across each of the individual measures. The "total" demand variable for the initial results presented below is the summation of each of the subcommittee variables.
Results
In the tables and figures below, we provide some descriptive statistics describing earmarks for the 110 th Congress. We then turn to a series of multiple regression results that 10 We thank Gary Jacobson, as always, for supplying his data on election results. 11 An alternative way to measure this concept might be to take the natural log of the previous vote share. demonstrate while there are some similarities across the different subcommittees, there are some important differences as well. In addition, our goal is to provide evidence consistent with our theoretical expectations that earmarks are generally distributed based on institutional positions within the chamber (supply) and district needs (demand). The next figure, Figure 3 , breaks down the amount of earmark dollars by party and subcommittee. As expected the majority party, despite controlling only 53.6 percent of the seats, takes just over 60 percent of the earmark dollars and leaves the rest for the minority party
Republicans. Compared to our other figures, there is less variation across subcommittees, suggesting an accepted norm of sharing earmarks at this level for each subcommittee. This majority party advantage is consistent with remarks by members of Congress and previous work both in the House (Balla et al. 2002) and Senate (Crespin and Finocchiaro 2007) . By giving a respectable share of earmarks to the minority party, Balla et al. (2002) argue that the majority party is avoiding the public backlash that might arise from spending money on local, rather than, national needs.
Finally, in Figure 4 we compare for each party the average amount of earmark dollars members earn based on the competitiveness of their previous election. Here, and later in the regression analysis, we call a district competitive if a member received less than 60 percent of the vote.
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If earmarks are a way for members to increase their chances for reelection, we would expect members from more competitive districts to receive more earmarks dollars, on average, compared to other members. This figure and our regression analyses at the subcommittee level that follow fail to find members from competitive districts consistently receiving more earmark dollars compared to 12 A large share of earmark dollars for this subcommittee goes to fund presidential libraries. 13 We realize that this is somewhat of a judgment call and have rerun our analyses using 55 percent as the cutoff for competitiveness. We do get slightly different results using this lower level; however the results are not consistently different. For the Democrats we find that Defense is significant in the opposite direction, and the difference on Military Construction is no longer significant. For the Republicans, Agriculture, Defense and Labor-HHS-Ed. are no longer significant while CJS is significant in the expected direction. safe members. For example, while Democrats from competitive districts receive significantly more Military Construction earmarks, they get less from the CJS bill. Competitive Republican members earn more from one committee, Labor-HHS-Ed. but less from two committees, Agriculture and Defense. Although the difference is not statistically significant in the total category, members in both parties who received less than 60 percent of the vote in their last election actually took home fewer earmark dollars, on average. This suggests to us that institutional positions such as serving on the appropriations committee or being in the majority party trump electoral concerns. Below, we test these claims further in a series of regressions that allow us to control for several mitigating factors.
In Table 1 , we pool all earmarks together and test for the influence of both supply and demand. Then, in Tables 2 and 3 , we see if the results are consistent when we examine the earmarks for each of the subcommittees and by party. Since our understanding of the earmark process suggests that the subcommittees and parties act independently, we feel that the second set of results should more accurately reflect actual variation across different members or districts.
For each set of regressions, we include a separate observation for each fiscal year but cluster the standard errors on individual members to control for the possible lack of independence.
For the regression pooling all earmarks in Table 1 , the results are largely as we expected.
When interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind that for some members, the coefficients' dollar amounts are additive. For example, David Obey, the chair of the appropriations committee, takes home $38 million as the chair, $16 million as the cardinal of Labor-HHS-Ed. and another $18 million for serving on the committee for a total of $72 million.
14 The ranking member of the committee, Jerry Lewis, also takes a substantial portion of 14 Although the coefficient on Cardinal is not significant, we can treat these two terms as like an interaction for Obey and an F-test of joint significance indicates a statistically significant effect. the earmark dollars -70.1 million. The results also indicate significant returns for subcommittee ranking members, members in the chamber leadership, and individuals with more seniority. In this pooled model, members from competitive districts earn more earmark dollars than members from less competitive districts. This result is somewhat surprising given the previous results from Figure 4 . However, the increase of just $2.6 million is small compared to the coefficients on the institutional supply variables. In terms of demand, we find that districts with more "need" for earmarks do receive more earmark dollars. Finally, as expected, Democrats get more earmark dollars compared to members of the minority party.
When we compare the results across parties, we find some important differences. Next, the results show that the Democrats allocate more earmarks to members from competitive districts while the Republicans do not. This is interesting since Figure 4 shows no large difference between the two parties in the total earmark category. Finally, the demand variable is significant in the Republican model but not in the Democratic model.
In Tables 2 and 3 , we present the results of separate regressions for each of the subcommittees for both parties. The variables in each of the models are similar to the total earmark models with two exceptions. First, the demand variable is now specific to the individual subcommittee. We have also included a variable that taps the ideological distance between the chair or ranking member of the subcommittee and each member of the respective parties. Our goal with this variable is to determine whether chairs and ranking members give more earmarks to individuals who are close to them on the ideological spectrum. Since we have 100 coefficients to report for each party, we use a simple color scheme to simplify the results. If a coefficient is significant in the predicted direction at the .05 level, its cell is shaded green. Results that are significant in the opposite direction are shaded red. Since we do not have a prediction for the constant, we return to the conventional star to indicate significance. The color coding should make it easier to identify patterns across the different subcommittees. Table 2 subcommittees usually obtain more earmarks than those not on the subcommittees. Members who serve on the full committee also earn more earmark dollars for three of the subcommittees, Agriculture, CJS, and Defense, independent of serving on the subcommittee. The results also indicate that the leadership takes an additional helping of earmark dollars from seven of the committees. Finally, the demand variable is only significant in the expected direction for three subcommittees, Agriculture, Defense and Military Construction, while it is significant in the opposite direction for Interior. The lack of more consistently significant relationships may be a function of the fact that constituency demand is, at least to some degree, encapsulated in subcommittee membership since high-demanders are more likely to find themselves on the relevant committees than those who are uninterested. Additionally, in future analysis, we plan to pursue additional measures of district demand since for some subcommittees the measures are weaker than others and we were not able to include every measure employed by Adler.
Furthermore, more detailed consideration of the types of earmarks produced by the various subcommittees will yield further insights into the degree to which existing measures adequately tap "demand" -which may not be fully captured by existing programmatically-oriented jurisdictional measures.
Two other results that are quite different from the pooled Democratic model are the seniority and competitive district variables. Both of these were significant previously but do not reach conventional levels when we examine the subcommittees separately. In terms of the ideological distance variable, we do not find evidence that Cardinals are rewarding their ideological friends. Finally, we wish to point out that none of the variables were significant in the Financial Services model for either party. As mentioned previously, it appears most of the earmarks went to individuals requesting funds for presidential libraries and the total amount of pork distributed by this subcommittee is rather small compared to most of the others.
We present the final set of results for the Republican Party in Table 3 . Similar to Obey, Jerry Lewis takes extra earmarks from a few subcommittees, Defense, Homeland Security, and Military Construction, but less from Agriculture. Ranking members also receive extra earmarks from Defense, Energy and Water, Homeland Security, and Interior. Surprisingly, we find that ranking member Kingston receives significantly fewer earmarks from his Agriculture subcommittee than his colleagues, although his earmark profile is still considerably better than rank and file members when the additive effect of his membership on the subcommittee and full committee is taken into account. Consistent with the pooled results, we see here that members on the full committee take extra earmarks almost across the board while the leadership gets less on three subcommittees. We also continue to find that more senior members or individuals from competitive districts do not obtain any extra earmarks. In two instances the demand variable is positive and significant. It appears that for both parties, demand is an important factor for the Agriculture subcommittee -a finding that is consistent with the long-standing view of this policy area as one that is populated with "high demanders." Finally, it appears that Republican ranking members are much more likely to reward ideological friends with earmarks compared to the Democrats.
Discussion
In this paper, we develop a simple "supply" and "demand" theory of earmark allocation in the House of Representatives. Because new ethics rules require the bills to list the recipients of individual earmarks, we are now able to test hypotheses associated with our theory. We argue and demonstrate that members who control the supply of earmarks, i.e. the appropriations committee chair and ranking member, subcommittee Cardinals and ranking members, and rankand-file members of the committee or subcommittee, will receive a larger share of the earmark pool. In addition, we show that to some extent, district demand for earmark dollars drives the process.
We then go one step further and show that while there are many similarities, Democrats and Republicans do not allocate earmarks in identical ways. For example, Republican leaders do not take more earmarks compared to rank-and-file members -a fact that is consistent with their rhetoric. In addition, when all earmarks are pooled, district demand for projects plays a much more significant role for the minority party than it does for the Democrats.
Next, and perhaps more importantly, we conduct a separate analysis for each subcommittee and show that the earmark process is not as neat and tidy as our pooled models indicate. For example, although members who control the supply of earmarks generally receive additional dollars, this is not true for all of the subcommittees. In addition, we fail to find consistent evidence at the subcommittee level that members who are electorally vulnerable receive extra money for projects in their districts. In some ways, the results from the subcommittee models are unsatisfying because they call into question some of the generalizations that we can make from the pooled model. However, our reading of journalistic accounts, observations of the appropriations process, and discussions with staff indicate that this level of analysis is appropriate for understanding the allocation of earmarks because it more closely resembles the actual data generating process (Morton 1999) .
While this paper has clearly demonstrated that differences exist, it needs to probe further to show why the subcommittees do not all act in the same fashion. As we move forward with our research, we hope to interview more staffers and members since they can help us to answer these questions. Until then, we encourage other scholars to acknowledge these differences as they study the allocation of earmarks in the appropriations process. 
